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From a normative perspective, it is striking that the degree of central bank independence (CBI) 
varies considerably across countries. Taking a political economy perspective, this paper 
demonstrates how different degrees of CBI may be the result of ‘strategic policy-making’. 
While an independent central bank reduces the incumbent politician’s chances to influence 
current monetary policy it also raises the costs of future policy changes for political 
successors. Hence, when deciding on the degree of CBI, incumbent politicians face a trade-off: 
current influence on monetary policy versus policy durability. This paper shows how various 
factors change this trade-off and hence the institutional choice. The model predicts that the 
level of CBI incumbent politicians choose will increase in politicians’ ability to screen central 
bankers’ preferences, in the degree of political polarization, and in the weight politicians place 
on future policy outcomes. In contrast, the likelihood for the implementation of an 
independent central bank decreases in the re-election prospects of incumbents and in the 
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The degree of central bank independence (CBI) varies considerably across countries 
(Cukierman, 2007, Arnone et al., 2006). This is revealed by both, ‘de jure’ and ‘de facto’ 
measures of CBI (Eijffinger and De Haan, 1996). De jure measures are based on the analysis 
of central bank statutes and typically include criteria like the term duration of central bankers, 
a central bank’s budgetary autonomy, and procedures for central bankers’ appointment 
(Alesina, 1988, Grilli et al., 1991, Eijffinger and Schaling, 1992).1 However, as noted by 
Cukierman (1992), de facto independence may well differ from what is formally laid down in 
central bank laws.2 In this regard, Chappell et al. (1993) present empirical evidence for two 
main sources of political sway on the central bank which also may vary in their importance 
for different countries. While the first source stems from direct political pressure (‘direct 
channel of political influence’), the second source rests on politicians’ ability to nominate 
central bankers that share their ideological preferences and act accordingly (‘indirect channel 
of political influence’). Hence, political influence may be the result of partisan appointments 
to the central bank (Waller, 1992).   
 
There is a broad consensus among economists that granting a high level of independence to 
the central bank is sound policy. This view mainly rests on two theoretical arguments and is 
also largely supported by empirical evidence (Eijffinger and De Haan, 1996, Berger et al., 
2001). First, as shown by Rogoff (1985), delegating monetary policy to an independent and 
inflation-averse (‘conservative’) central banker can serve as a commitment device to 
circumvent the famous time inconsistency problem of monetary policy (Kydland and Prescott, 
1977, Barro and Gordon, 1983). The second argument in favor of CBI abandons the 
assumption of politicians acting as benevolent social planners. In this regard, two potential 
sources that may distort politicians’ preferences from those of society are proposed. First, 
politicians may aim at increasing their chances of re-election, using monetary policy and 
thereby create a so called opportunistic political business cycle (Nordhaus, 1975, Persson and 
Tabellini, 1990). Second, if politicians have partisan preferences, a shift in the composition of 
government should imply changes in the conduct of monetary policy, and hence a ‘partisan 
                                                 
1 This ‘legal approach’ has been criticized for the somewhat arbitrary choice of criteria included and the 
subjective interpretation of central bank statutes (Eijffinger and De Haan, 1996).  
2 Cukierman et al. (1992) suggest using the turnover rate of central bank governors as an indicator for the level 
of CBI. The underlying idea is that a longer term length of central bankers is associated with a higher degree of 
CBI and vice versa. It has been argued, however, that causality may run in the opposite direction since a 
subservient central banker could virtually hold office forever (Eijffinger and De Haan, 1996). 
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political business cycle’ (Hibbs, 1977, Alesina, 1987). Granting a high degree of autonomy to 
the central bank should limit these politically induced distortions and hence the scope for 
political business cycles. Given these potentially large benefits of an independent central bank, 
one can doubt that the actual degree of CBI is chosen optimally – in a welfare-maximizing 
sense – in every country. In other words, it seems difficult to explain the variations of CBI 
across countries when adopting a normative point of view. 
 
Taking a political economy perspective instead, this paper argues that the degree of CBI may 
be the result of ‘strategic policy-making’.3 It has been shown that incumbent politicians may 
act strategically by taking into account the impact of their decisions today on their successors’ 
future policy options. In this regard, the ‘strategic use of deficits’ has received a great deal of 
attention (Alesina and Tabellini, 1990, Persson and Svensson, 1989, and Tabellini and 
Alesina, 1990). Persson and Svensson (1989), for instance, demonstrate that governments that 
face uncertainty about re-election may choose higher budget deficits than they would if re-
election was certain, to limit the room for maneuver of subsequent governments. This paper 
demonstrates how similar strategic considerations may drive incumbent politicians to 
establish different degrees of CBI. For incumbents there are costs and benefits associated with 
an independent central bank. While a high level of CBI effectively constraints subsequent 
governments by raising the costs for future policy changes it also reduces the incumbent’s 
influence on current monetary policy. Hence, when deciding on the degree of CBI, incumbent 
politicians face a trade-off: policy durability versus current influence. 
 
The model presented below shows how various factors determine this trade-off and hence the 
institutional choice. To do so, the relationship between purely partisan parties, differing in 
their preferences over monetary policy, and a central banker is modeled as a signaling game. 
Central bankers, like politicians, have ideological preferences over monetary policy but 
additionally receive utility from holding office. If a high degree of CBI is implemented, 
politicians will not have the means to exert pressure on the central bank since central bankers 
cannot be replaced. However, neither party can reverse the initial appointment decision which 
thus is durable. On the contrary, a low level of CBI is associated with a shorter term length of 
central bankers. In this case, the ‘threat of replacement’ may force central bankers to act 
opportunistically, i.e. conduct monetary policy in line with politicians’ preferences, to 
maximize their expected time in office.  
                                                 
3 This argument follows Hanssen (2004) who discusses the level of judicial independence in a similar framework. 
Related arguments are made by Goodman (1991), Bernard et al. (2002), and Dreher et al. (2007). 
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The model predicts that the level of CBI incumbent politicians choose will be higher, the 
worse their re-election prospects are, the more weight they place on future policy outcomes, 
and the better their ability to appoint an ideologically desired candidate is. If the incumbent’s 
probability of being re-elected is high, the relative advantage of CBI in terms of durability 
shrinks compared to the disadvantage of forgone current influence since the political 
opponent is less likely to hold office and, thus, to be in the position to reverse the currently 
incumbent’s appointment decision. Similarly, policy durability gains importance when the 
future becomes more relevant for politicians. However, if the incumbent’s probability of 
selecting an ideologically desired candidate is low, this may turn the benefits of CBI into a 
disadvantage for the incumbent since he cannot correct a possibly wrong appointment 
decision. Moreover, the likelihood for the implementation of an independent central bank is 
positively affected by the degree of political polarization but negatively by the utility central 
bankers receive from holding office and by the weight they place on future developments. As 
discussed below, the intuition behind these results derives from the incentives for central 
bankers to act opportunistically by satisfying the incumbent’s policy demands in order to 
maximize their expected time in office.  
 
 
2. Related Literature 
 
This paper relates to the literature on strategic policy-making and to the literature on the 
determinants of CBI. The latter may be subdivided into two strands, one that adopts a 
normative perspective and one – the political economy literature – predominantly taking a 
positive point of view. The normative literature mainly builds on the time-inconsistency 
problem (Kydland and Prescott, 1977, Barro and Gordon, 1983) and the solutions proposed 
by Rogoff (1985) and Walsh (1995). Along these lines, Cukierman (1994) argues that the 
gains from CBI will be higher in countries that suffer from a large inflationary bias. 
Consequently, the incentives to establish an independent central bank should increase in 
factors worsening the inflationary bias, such as a high natural rate of unemployment (see also 
Eijffinger and Schaling, 1995 and Franzese, 1999). Similarly, the potential gains from CBI 
have been related to public debt (Cukierman, 1994). If CBI successfully moderates inflation 
expectations, the interest charge on government debt should decrease in the level of CBI. 
Hence, a large stock of public debt should strengthen the incentives to create an independent 
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central bank. 4  The empirical literature, however, does not find much support for these 
normative hypotheses (Dreher et al. 2007, De Haan and Van’t Hag, 1995, Eijffinger and 
Schaling, 1995). This may not come as a surprise as the pure time inconsistency framework 
does not provide a convincing rationale for not implementing an independent central bank 
(Bernhard et al., 2002).5   
 
The political economy literature, on the other hand, provides such a rationale by taking into 
account self-interests of political actors. One line of research stresses the ‘opposition to 
inflation’ as a potentially important determinant of CBI. Goodman (1991) argues that 
politicians may be forced to increase CBI by strong conservative coalitions in the society. In 
this regard, Posen (1993) identifies the financial sector as the main interest group advocating 
price stability and hence as the main driving force for CBI. A related argument is put forth by 
Hayo (1998) who points out that the general public attitude towards inflation – formed by 
‘historical feedback processes’ – may be crucial for the choice of the degree of CBI. 
 
A second set of political economy papers focuses on diverging interests of decision-makers. 
In this regard, the existence of checks and balances has been related to a country’s level of 
CBI. Hallerberg (2002) argues that a multitude of veto players will limit politicians’ ability to 
override the decisions of a central bank and thereby affect the degree of CBI. Similarly, 
Moser (1999) shows in a model with two veto-empowered decision-making bodies that the 
commitment to an independent central bank will only be credible if there are appropriate 
checks and balances at work (see also Keefer and Stasavage, 2003). A related body of 
research focuses on intra-coalition conflicts as a motive for delegating monetary policy 
(Bernhard and Leblang, 2002). Crowe (2006) presents a model on coalition formation in a 
two-dimensional policy space. He shows that it will be costly for agents to join a coalition if 
preferences over both policy dimensions are uncorrelated. In this case, limiting the policy 
space by delegating monetary policy to an independent central bank reduces the costs of 
coalition formation.  
 
Finally, the wish to constrain future governments has been identified as a potentially 
important motive for the implementation of an independent central bank. Goodman (1991) 
                                                 
4 There is, however, also a political economy argument pointing in the opposite direction as the incentives to 
reduce the real stock of debt by creating surprise inflation should be stronger the higher the total amount of 
public debt is (Eijffinger and De Haan, 1996). 
5 Note that, in the standard time inconsistency framework, the costs in terms of suboptimal stabilization policy 
arise from the conservativeness of a central bank not from its independence (Berger et al., 2001).  
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suggests that incumbents’ expectations regarding their time in office should be crucial for 
their assessment of the potential gains from ‘tying the hands of political successors’ (see also 
Bernhard et al., 2002 and Cukierman, 1992). The present paper formalizes this argument and 
shows how the costs of CBI, in terms of forgone current influence, and the benefits, arising 
from policy durability, are affected by various parameters. Hence, this paper contributes to the 
theoretical literature on the determinants of CBI which – up to now – is rare as most of the 
papers cited above either follow an empirical or an institutional approach.6   
 
This article also relates to the literature on strategic policy-making. It has been suggested that 
incumbent politicians may choose certain policies in order to limit the policy options of 
potential successors. In this regard, it has been argued that office holders may increase deficits 
above a social optimal level to limit the fiscal latitude of political opponents (Alesina and 
Tabellini, 1990, Persson and Svensson, 1989). The notion of imposing restrictions on future 
decision-makers also appears in Glazer (1989) who discusses the choice of durability of 
investment projects. In his model, rational voters (and thus office-seeking governments) may 
opt for more permanent investment projects in order to restrict the set of policy choices of 
future voters.  
 
The present work builds on – and therefore is closely related to – Hanssen (2004) who 
analyzes how strategic policy-making may determine the level of juridical independence. In 
his model, politicians face uncertainty about the ideological type of judges, but have perfect 
knowledge about a judge’s attitude towards holding office, that is, politicians know whether a 
specific judge is motivated by opportunism or ideology. This paper extends Hanssen’s model 
by allowing central bankers to be motivated by both, holding office and ideology, with central 
bankers’ preferences being private knowledge. These extensions allow modeling the channels 
of political influence identified by Chappell et al. (1993). While the indirect channel – via the 
appointment process – requires central bankers to have ideological preferences, there are two 
necessary conditions for the direct channel – via political pressure – to appear. Central 
bankers must be office-seeking, at least to some degree, and politicians need to have the 
means to exert pressure on the central bank. In the model, the latter condition is only fulfilled 
if a low level of CBI has been established which gives rise to the direct channel of political 
influence. Moreover, these extensions have important technical implications. As central 
bankers do not know which party will hold governmental power and will be in the position to 
                                                 
6 Exceptions are Cukierman (1994), Moser (1999), Keefer and Stasavage (2003), and Crowe (2006). 
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replace them, a signaling game arises where both, the sender’s type (central banker) and the 
receiver’s type (politician) are uncertain when players choose their strategies.7 
 
 
3. The Model 
 
Consider two purely partisan political parties, ,i L R= . 8  Parties only differ in their 
preferences over monetary policy, possibly reflecting varying preferences of the constituency 
they represent. With regard to monetary policy, it is often argued that rightist parties act in the 
interests of high income voters and are thus more inflation-averse than leftist parties which 
are more concerned with unemployment and output (Hibbs, 1977, Persson and Tabellini, 
2002). The incumbent party nominates a central banker (CB) who conducts monetary policy. 
Like politicians, CBs have ideological preferences that can either be in line with party L’s 
preferences (a ‘leftist’ CB) or with those of party R (a ‘rightist’ CB).9 CBs are additionally 
concerned with holding office, giving rise to career motivated (‘opportunistic’) behavior. In 
the beginning of the two-period game, the initially incumbent party (which, without loss of 
generality, is assumed to be L) makes a binding choice on the institutional setting, i.e. on the 
degree of independence granted to the central bank. CBI is a discrete variable and can only 
take two values, ‘high’ (institution I) or ‘low’ (institution D). Institution I guarantees the CB a 
two-period term length. As a consequence, the politician cannot punish the CB for conducting 
the undesired monetary policy by replacement. In contrast, D is associated with a one-period 
term length of CBs. Here, the CB can be replaced in the beginning of period two by the party 
that holds governmental power at that time.10  
 
Figure 1 depicts the sequence of events. At the institutional stage, 0t , the incumbent party L 
chooses I or D. At the beginning of period 1, L nominates a CB selected from a large set of 
candidates (see below). The CB then carries out monetary policy, by directly controlling the 
inflation rate in period 1 ( )1π  which is assumed to be a discrete variable that can only take 
two values, { },t L Rπ π π∈ , 1, 2t = . At the end of 1t , elections are held where the incumbent 
                                                 
7 Usually, in this kind of game, only the sender’s type is unknown (Sibert, 2002, Chortareas and Miller, 2003).  
8 In this paper, the terms politicians and parties are used synonymously.  
9 The notion of partisan preferences of CBs is widely used in the literature (Waller, 1992, Lohmann 1997, Sieg, 
1997) and empirical evidence is presented by Berger and Woitek (2005).   
10 Note that, under D (‘dependence’) CBs are free to set monetary policy, too. However, career concerns may 
drive CBs to act in the interest of politicians. Hence, the level of de facto CBI is lower under D.   
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party faces the exogenous probability of reelection p (the opponent wins with 1-p).11 Under I, 
the CB that has been nominated in 1t  remains in office while under D, the CB can be replaced 
by the winner of the elections. Finally, the CB who holds office in 2t  carries out monetary 
policy.   
 
 
Note that the model captures institutional persistence as a stylized fact, by assuming that the 
initially established central bank regime is left unchanged for the rest of the game. As shown 
by Acemoglu et al. (2001), institutions are long-lasting and only changed from time to time 
(see also Glaeser and Shleifer, 2002 and Przeworski et al., 1996). The literature offers several 
potential explanations.12 Paterson (2005), for instance, argues that institutions reinforce the 
existing distributions of political and economic power in society which prevents institutional 
changes. Alternatively, institutional persistence has been related to the existence of checks 
and balances (Moser, 1999, Hallerberg, 2002) as veto players may block changes from the 
status quo. To capture the notion of institutional persistence in the model, it is assumed that 
there is a window of opportunity where the institution can be altered by the government at a 
certain point in time ( )0t  but remains unchanged throughout the two subsequent periods.  
 
 
3.1 Preferences and Information 
Parties only differ in their preferences over monetary policy and are solely motivated by 
ideological concerns. In particular, as in Alesina and Rosenthal (1995), parties have different 
                                                 
11 The focus of this paper lies on the relationship between politicians and CBs. To simplify matters the second 
principal-agent-relationship between the electorate and politicians is ruled out by assuming an exogenous p.  
12 Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) discuss the question of institutional persistence in detail. 
      1t  
 t
Choice:     Appointment       
 I vs. D          of CB 
 
Replacement of CB
possible (under D)  
   0t  
1π                 Elections 
      2t  
Figure 1. Sequence of Events. 
2π    
 9
views on what inflation rate should be targeted.13 Parties’ preferences are common knowledge 
and captured by the following loss function: 





V β π π−
=
= −∑ , ,i L R= .   
Deviations of actual inflation in period t from the respective party’s bliss point of inflation 
( )iπ  generate a loss. The discount factor 0 1Pβ< <  is assumed to be identical for both parties.  
 
CBs, like politicians, have ideological preferences over monetary policy. However, in contrast 
to politicians, CBs additionally receive utility from holding office.14  This can be due to 
pecuniary rewards, prestige or generally the chance to extract private rents from holding 
office (Rogoff, 1990). As noted above, this is a prerequisite for politicians’ ability to 
pressurize CBs and hence for the direct channel of political influence to appear.15  As a 
consequence, CBs are – to some degree – driven by career concerns, possibly implying 
opportunistic behavior. In sum, CBs are motivated by both, ideology and opportunism which 
is reflected in the following loss function of CBs:   




CB t t CB
t
V Lβ χ χ π π−
=
⎡ ⎤= + − −⎣ ⎦∑  
Career concerns are captured by the dummy variable tL  which is zero if the CB holds office 
and a positive constant ( )L  otherwise, i.e. not holding office implies a loss for the CB.16 
Accordingly, the ideological component is captured by ( )2t CBπ π−  since deviations of actual 
inflation from the CB’s bliss point ( )CBπ  generate a loss, too. As stated above, a CB can be 
‘leftist’ or ‘rightist’, i.e. { },CB L Rπ π π∈ . Both motives are weighted by 0 1χ≤ ≤ . If 0χ =  the 
CB will solely be motivated by ideology whereas 1χ =  describes the case where the CB is 
exclusively driven by career concerns. Hence, χ  can be interpreted as the CB’s ‘degree of 
opportunism’. Finally, the discount factor 0 1CBβ< <  is assumed to be equal for all CBs. 
 
                                                 
13 Since this paper examines the determinants and not the effects of CBI, it is important to allow for differences 
in parties’ preferences over monetary policy. It is not crucial, however, where these differences are revealed. 
Hence, one could alternatively assume, as in Alesina (1987) that parties place a different relative weight on the 
real target in an objective function à la Barro and Gordon (1983).    
14 Including an additional ‘office-seeking’ component into the objective function of politicians would not change 
the results qualitatively, since the outcome of the elections is exogenous.   
15 Chortareas and Miller (2003) point out that selfishness of CBs is a necessary condition for implementing 
‘perfect contracts’ as proposed by Walsh (1995).    
16 Note that a candidate appointed in the beginning of the game will at least hold office throughout the first 
period; hence, for these candidates it holds that 
1 0L = . 
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As in Sibert (2002), CBs’ preferences are private knowledge. Specifically, neither the degree 
of opportunism ( )χ nor the ideological bliss point ( )CBπ  is directly observable for politicians 
when appointing a CB. However, the distributions of both criteria within the population of 
candidates are common knowledge. The same proportion of candidates share party L’s and 
R’s respective bliss point of inflation, that is, leftist and rightist CBs both make up 50% of the 
candidates’ population. Moreover, it is assumed that each ideological group consists of a 
continuum of candidates with different degrees of opportunism ( )χ . The distribution of χ  is 
given by the continuous density function ( )f χ  which is positive on the interval [ ]0,1 . 
 
 
3.2 Solving the Model 
This section derives the incumbent party’s expected loss from choosing either institution. 
While under I, there is no interaction between politicians and the CB after the appointment 
decision in 1t , under D, a signaling game arises where neither politicians (receivers) nor CBs 
(senders) know the type of the other player when choosing their strategies. 
 
Independence 
Under independence, the CB appointed in 1t  cannot be punished by replacement and remains 
in office for two periods. Hence, opportunistic motives do not play a role when conducting 
monetary policy and each CB will set the inflation rate equal to his ideological bliss point 
( )1 2 CBπ π π= = . Therefore, under institution I, only the indirect channel of political influence 
appears, making it crucial for politicians to find an ideologically desired candidate. However, 
candidates’ ideological preferences cannot be observed directly. Let δ  denote the probability 
for an incumbent party to appoint a CB who shares its ideological preferences. Since CBπ  is 
equally distributed on Lπ  and Rπ , random drawing implies 0.5δ = . However, if parties have 
some form of screening technology at their disposal, this will increase their chances of 
selecting a desired candidate. In the extreme of perfect screening there would be no 
uncertainty ( )1δ = . Hence, δ  depends positively on parties’ ability to screen candidates and 
is restricted to the interval 0.5 1δ≤ ≤ . According to (1), L’s expected loss of choosing 
institution I equals 
(3) ( ) ( )( )( )21 1L P R LIE V β δ π π= + − −  
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where E denotes the expectations operator. If L ‘luckily’ appoints a leftist CB, a loss of zero 
will occur ( )1 2 Lπ π π= = , whereas a rightist CB is appointed with probability ( )1 δ−  who 
will set 1 2 Rπ π π= = , implying (3). 
 
Dependence  
The signaling game that evolves under D is illustrated in figure 2, for the case where L 
initially holds governmental power.17 At the start of the game, the appointment decision takes 
place where a leftist candidate will become CB with probability δ , while with ( )1 δ−  a 
rightist CB is appointed. The CB then sets the inflation rate in 1t  equal to Lπ  or Rπ . If, for 
example, a rightist CB has been appointed who acts according to his ideological preferences 
( )1 Rπ π= , the game proceeds to the lower part of the right hand side of figure 2. At the end 
of period 1, elections take place where L (R) wins with p (1-p). The winner of the elections 
then decides whether to keep or replace the CB. If the rightist CB stays in office, he will set 
2 CBπ π=  as every CB will act according to his ideological preferences in 2t . In contrast, if the 
CB is replaced, the new CB will be of the incumbent’s ideologically desired type with δ . 
 
Politicians’ strategies 
In the beginning of 2t , the winner of the elections can either keep or replace the CB, 
appointed in 1t . After observing 1π , politicians still face uncertainty about the CB’s 
ideological type. If, for instance, politicians observe 1 Lπ π= , they do not know which node in 
the information set has been reached (illustrated by the dotted line on the left hand side in 
figure 2). Hence, politicians form posterior beliefs on CBs’ types. From the politicians’ 
perspective, let Lμ  denote the probability that the person in office is a leftist CB, given that 
the leftist policy has been carried out in 1t , i.e. ( )1L CB L Lprobμ π π π π= = = . Similarly, the 
probability that a rightist CB holds office, given that 1 Rπ π=  is given by 
( )1R CB R Rprobμ π π π π= = = .  
 
Politicians can pursue the following strategies. First, politicians can reward a CB who 
conducted monetary policy in line with their ideological preferences and punish a CB by 
                                                 
17 Note that figure 2 does not distinguish CBs’ types according to their degree of opportunism. Hence, figure 2 
does not provide the complete game in extensive form. Nevertheless, it is helpful for illustration purposes.   
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replacement who did not, i.e. (Keep CB if 1 iπ π= , Replace CB if 1 iπ π≠ ). Second, politicians 
can always keep or always replace a CB, independent of the policy carried out in 1t . Finally, 
politicians can replace a CB who conducted monetary policy in line with their ideological 




As stated above, each CB will act according to his ideological preferences in 2t  because he 
cannot be punished afterwards, implying 2 CBπ π= . Therefore, strategic considerations only 
play a role in the first period. In 1t , both ideological types of CBs have two strategies at their 
disposal. They can either act ‘ideologically’, i.e. in line with their ideological preferences 
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Figure 2. Signaling Game under D. 
L initially incumbent. 
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strategy is associated with a certain loss for the CB in 1t  and thus can only be due to career 
concerns. Note that a CB does not know which party will be in the position to keep or replace 
him when choosing his strategy. However, CBs are forward-looking and take into account the 
likely outcome of the elections when trying to maximize their time in office, by satisfying 
politicians’ policy demands.18 
 
Equilibrium 
In the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the game described here, strategies of all players as 
well as politicians’ posterior beliefs about CBs’ types have to be consistent (see, for instance, 
Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991). In what follows, I will derive the unique equilibrium of the 
game in pure strategies. It will be shown that the only strategy of politicians that is consistent 
with a pure strategy equilibrium is (Keep CB if 1 iπ π= , Replace CB if 1 iπ π≠ ). To complete 
the description of the equilibrium, one needs to derive CBs optimal actions, given that 
politician i plays this strategy of ‘reward and punishment’. In a first step, the optimization 
problem of leftist CBs is analyzed.  
 
Although, in the model, CBs are generally motivated by both, opportunism and ideology, 
their action can only be either ideological or opportunistic. A leftist CB who acts 
ideologically by setting 1 Lπ π= , experiences the following expected loss [according to 
equation (2)]: 
(4) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ). 21 1ideolCB CB R LDE V p Lβ χ χ δ π π⎡ ⎤= − + − −⎣ ⎦  
Acting ideologically is associated with a loss of zero for the CB in 1t . If L wins the elections, 
the CB will stay in office and set 2 Lπ π= . Hence, in this case, no loss will occur in 2t  either. 
On the contrary, if R wins the elections, the CB will be replaced, implying a loss of L  for not 
holding office in 2t  and an ideologically induced loss of ( )2R Lπ π−  if R appoints a rightist 
CB which happens with probability δ . 
 
Similarly, the expected loss for a leftist CB from acting opportunistically ( )1 Rπ π=  equals:   
(5) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( ). 2 21 1 1oppCB R L CB R LDE V p Lχ π π β χ χ δ π π⎡ ⎤= − − + + − − −⎣ ⎦  
                                                 
18 This implies that a politician whose chances of re-election are low (a ‘lame duck’) will never see his policy 
demands satisfied due to opportunistic behavior.  
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The first term in (5) describes the certain loss in period 1 resulting from opportunistic action. 
The second term is the loss the CB experiences if L wins the elections. In this case, the CB 
will be replaced and a rightist CB will be appointed with probability ( )1 δ− . 
 
A leftist CB will act opportunistically if ( ) ( ). .opp ideolCB CB
D D
E V E V< .19 Comparing equations (4) 
and (5) and rearranging shows that a leftist CB will act opportunistically if 
( )( ) ( ) ( )21 1 1 2R L CB CBp p Lχ π π β δ β χ⎡ ⎤− − + − < −⎣ ⎦ . Since the left hand side of this 
inequality is non-negative this condition is never fulfilled for 0.5p ≥ . That is, a leftist CB 
will never act opportunistically if 0.5p ≥ . The intuition for this finding is straightforward: in 
expectation terms, opportunistic action will only pay off for a leftist CB if the certain loss of 
deviating from ideological preferences in 1t  is outweighed by a sufficiently high chance of 
holding office in 2t  which would imply 2 0L =  and 2 Lπ π= . Hence, there is no reason for a 
leftist CB to act opportunistically by satisfying party R’s policy demands if R’s chances of 
being elected are low. However, if R’s election prospects are good, some leftist CBs will act 
opportunistically. Specifically, for 0.5p <  the condition for opportunistic behavior of a leftist 
CB can be rewritten as: 
(6) 
( ) ( )






CB R L crit
L
CB CB R L
p
p L p
β δ π πχ χβ β δ π π
⎡ ⎤+ − −⎣ ⎦> ≡⎡ ⎤− + + − −⎣ ⎦
 
Those CBs that place a relatively large weight on holding office compared to the ideological 
motive will choose the opportunistic action. Specifically, if the degree of opportunism ( )χ  
exceeds a certain threshold ( ).critLχ , a leftist CB will act opportunistically. Note that for 
0.5p <  it holds that .0 1critLχ< < . 
 
Going through the same steps as before, the condition for opportunistic behavior of rightist 
CBs can be derived. Rightist CBs will act opportunistically if ( ) ( ). .opp ideolCB CB
D D
E V E V< . Here, 
the same logic applies as for leftist CBs, that is, no rightist CB will act opportunistically if 
0.5p ≤ . Conversely, for 0.5p >  a rightist CB will act opportunistically if:  
                                                 
19 I assume that the marginal CB who is indifferent between both strategies will act ideologically. This is not 
crucial for calculating the ex ante probabilities for opportunistic behavior since χ  is a continuous variable.    
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(7) 
( ) ( )





2 1 1 1
CB L R crit
R
CB CB L R
p
p L p
β δ π πχ χβ β δ π π
⎡ ⎤+ − − −⎣ ⎦> ≡⎡ ⎤− + + − − −⎣ ⎦
 
 
Each CB will either act opportunistically or ideologically. The individual choice will depend 
on the specific value of χ , p, and the respective .critiχ  described by equations (6) and (7). 
However, from the politicians’ perspective, one can derive the probabilities for CBs to act 
opportunistically. Let Lq  and Rq  denote the probabilities for opportunistic behavior of leftist 
















χ χ= ∫ . For simplicity, I assume that χ  is uniformly 
distributed which delivers the following probabilities for opportunistic behavior: 
(8) 
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )




    if 0.5
1 2 1
0      if 0.5
2 1
if 0.5
2 1 1 1
0 if 0.5
CB
L CB CB R L
CB
R CB CB L R
p L
p




q p L p
p
β
β β δ π π
β
β β δ π π
⎧ − <⎪= ⎡ ⎤− + + − −⎨ ⎣ ⎦⎪ ≥⎩
⎧ − >⎪= ⎡ ⎤− + + − − −⎨ ⎣ ⎦⎪ ≤⎩
 
The actions of both parties and all types of CBs, as well as politicians’ posterior beliefs about 
the CB’s type have to be consistent in equilibrium. Proposition 1 describes the unique Perfect 
Bayesian Equilibrium of the game in pure strategies that complies with these requirements.   
 
Proposition 1      
The following strategies of politicians, leftist and rightist CBs together with the posterior 









−= ⎡ ⎤− + −⎣ ⎦









− −= ⎡ ⎤+ − −⎣ ⎦
 define the 
unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the game in pure strategies if  ( )2 21 Lqδ δ− ≥ : 
Politician i plays (Replace CB if 1 iπ π≠ , Keep CB if 1 iπ π= ), 
Leftist CBs set 
.
1 .
      if





π χ χπ π χ χ
⎧ >= ⎨ ≤⎩
, Rightist CBs set 
.
1 .
    if





π χ χπ π χ χ
⎧ >= ⎨ ≤⎩
. 




Given this equilibrium, L’s expected loss from choosing institution D equals:  
(9) 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
21 1 1 1( )







δ β δ δ δ β δ π πδ β δ
⎧ ⎫⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− + − + − + + −⎪ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎪= −⎨ ⎬⎡ ⎤− − + − −⎪ ⎪⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭
.  
The effect of opportunistic behavior on L’s expected loss from choosing D is ambiguous. 
While the likelihood of rightist CBs acting opportunistically ( )Rq  increases L’s expected pay-
off ( )( )1 1 0P pβ δ⎡ ⎤+ − − >⎣ ⎦ , the opposite is true for opportunistic behavior of leftist CBs, Lq , 
since ( )1 0P pβ δ⎡ ⎤+ − >⎣ ⎦ . A positive Lq  means that a fraction of leftist CBs will carry out 
monetary policy in line with R’s ideological preferences which implies this finding. Hence, 
from the incumbent’s perspective, there is a form of ‘desired’ and ‘undesired’ opportunistic 




To shed light on the determinants of the institutional choice, it is convenient to rewrite (9) as 
(10) ( ) ( )L L
D I
E V E V κ= + ,  
with ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 1 1 1 1R L P L P R Pp q p q pκ π π β δ δ δ β δ δ β δ⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= − − + + − − − + − −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦ . Since 
the incumbent will choose the institution that results in the higher expected pay-off, it directly 
follows from (10) that I (D) is the optimal choice if 0κ > ( )0κ < , whereas the incumbent 
will be indifferent for 0κ = . A closer inspection of κ  shows that the relation of p  and δ  is 
of special importance for the institutional choice as, for some cases, this relation will 
determine the institution, irrespective of other variables.21  
 
The following cases can be distinguished and are illustrated in figure 3.22 First, the incumbent 
is indifferent between both institutions ( )0κ =  if 0.5p δ= =  (point A in figure 3). In this 
case, there is no opportunistic behavior of CBs ( ), 0L Rq q = , implying 1 2 CBπ π π= = . Since 
0.5δ = , both institutions yield a probability of 0.5  for Lπ  in both periods, making L 
                                                 
20 Note that both forms of opportunism will never occur simultaneously [see equation (8)]. 
21 This is true as long as there is political polarization. From ( )2 . 0R L critπ π− =  it follows that 0κ =  and the 
incumbent is indifferent between I and D, independent of other variables.    
22 Figure 3 serves an illustration purpose and abstracts from the condition required for the equilibrium described 
by proposition 1. In fact, for 0.5p < ( )0.5Lq > , δ  has to be smaller than 1 which is ignored in figure 3.   
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indifferent between I and D.23 Second, the optimal choice will be I ( )0κ >  if 0.5 pδ > >  
(area I in figure 3).24 Third, D will be the optimal choice ( )0κ <  if 0.5p δ> >  (area II in 
figure 3).25 Finally, for 0.5pδ > >  one cannot sign κ  straightaway. Plugging in Rq  from (8) 
and rearranging shows that κ  is positive and therefore I the optimal choice if: 
(11) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) ( ) ( )
2 2
.
2 1 1 1 2 1
1 1
CB P





β δ β δπ π π πβ δ δ β δ
⎡ ⎤− − − − −⎣ ⎦− > ⋅ ≡ −⎡ ⎤− + − −⎣ ⎦
 
A sufficient condition for this inequality to hold is ( )2 . 0R L critπ π− < . As the denominator of 
(11) is positive for the case of 0.5pδ > >  considered here, inequality (11) always holds if the 
nominator is negative. This is the case if ( ) ( ) .1 1 1 2 1P P critp pδ β β δ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤> + − + − ≡⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ . 
Therefore, ( )2 . 0R L critπ π− <  and I is always the optimal choice if . 0.5crit pδ δ> > >  (area III 
in figure 3) while both institutions are a theoretical possibility if . 0.5crit pδ δ> > >  (area IV 
in figure 3).26  
 
From these considerations the following result can be derived. 
 
                                                 
23 The same is true for the somewhat trivial case of 1p δ= =  where the incumbent will not face any loss under 
either institution. 
24 Precisely, both marginal cases 0.5 pδ ≥ > ( )0, 0R Lq q= >  and 0.5 pδ > ≥ ( )0,  0R Lq q= ≥ lead to 0κ > . 
25 In fact, 0.5p δ> ≥  and 0.5p δ≥ >  imply 0κ < , as 0, 0R Lq q> = . 
26 Note that .crit pδ >  for 1p < , .0.5 1critδ< <  for 0.5p = , . 1critδ =  for 1p = , and . 0crit pδ∂ ∂ > .  
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Figure 3.  Optimal institutional choice. 
Institution I is optimal in areas I and III; institution D is the optimal 
choice in area II; either institution can be optimal in area IV. 
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Result 1:  A higher probability of re-election lowers the probability for the implementation 
of an independent central bank.  
 
The intuition for this result is the following. From the incumbent’s point of view, there are 
two principle advantages associated with D. First, the incumbent may be able to correct a 
possibly wrong appointment decision, made in 1t , by replacing a CB who did not conduct the 
desired policy. Second, the threat of replacement may drive a CB to act opportunistically by 
satisfying the incumbent party’s policy demands (direct channel of political influence). 
However, both principle advantages critically depend on the chances of being re-elected. If p  
is low, the political opponent is more likely to enjoy both advantages. Specifically, for 0.5p < , 
there will be opportunistic behavior in favor of R ( )0Lq >  and it is likely that R will be in the 
position to reverse L’s appointment decision. As a consequence, a higher p makes D relatively 
more attractive.27 As p is attached to incumbency, not to a particular party, the probability of 
re-election can be interpreted in a broad sense, namely as a measure of political stability. In 
countries that are politically stable – in terms of the frequency of government change – the 
incumbents’ re-election prospects should, all else equal, generally be better than in countries 
that face a high frequency of government change (Dreher et al., 2006, De Haan and Van’t 
Haag, 1995). In this regard, Goodman (1991) attributes the institutional change towards a 
higher degree of CBI in Italy in 198128 to a generally more instable political environment 
where both political camps faced higher uncertainty about their future chances of holding 
office. The next result captures the impact of δ  on the institutional choice. 
 
Result 2:  A better screening ability favors the implementation of an independent central 
bank.  
 
The basic advantage of I is that the appointment decision made in 1t  cannot be reversed by the 
political successor; hence any appointment decision is durable. Therefore, the probability of 
selecting an ideologically desired candidate ( )δ  plays a crucial role under I. Although an 
improved screening ability makes L better off under both institutions,29 this positive effect is 
                                                 
27 Note that this is also true for the case of .critδ δ>  where both institutions are a theoretical possibility since (11) 
is less likely fulfilled for a higher p as ( )2 . 0R L crit pπ π∂ − ∂ > . 
28 From 1981 on, the Bank of Italy was restricted to finance government spending.    
29 Differentiating (3) and (9) implies this finding as ( ) 0L DE L δ∂ ∂ < , ( ) 0L IE L δ∂ ∂ < . 
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weaker under D since it is partially contradicted by a better screening ability of party R who 
will enjoy the right to appoint a CB in 2t  with ( )1 p− . Therefore, a higher δ  favors I.30  
 
So far, the probability of re-election and parties’ screening ability have been identified as 
important criteria underlying the institutional choice. When analyzing the other factors that 
may drive incumbents to establish a certain institution, it is reasonable to concentrate on the 
case of . 0.5crit pδ δ> > >  where both institutions are a theoretical possibility. In particular, an 
independent central bank will be established if inequality (11) holds, i.e. if the discrepancy 
between ideological preferences exceeds a critical threshold.31  This directly leads to the 
following finding. 
 
Result 3:  Strong political polarization increases the likelihood for the implementation of an 
independent central bank.   
 
Since the costs for politicians that arise from the undesired policy remain similar for both 
institutions, this result stems from a change in the probability of the undesired policy to occur. 
In particular, a higher degree of polarization changes the relative pay-offs from opportunistic 
and ideological behavior of rightist CBs.32 Acting opportunistically becomes more costly 
because the certain loss in 1t  arising from opportunistic behavior increases in ( )2L Rπ π−  
while the pay-off from the potential reward of holding office in 2t  remains unchanged ( )L . 
This implies that a lower proportion of rightist CBs will act in line with L’s policy demands 
( )( )2 0R L Rq π π∂ ∂ − <  which increases L’s expected loss from choosing D. It is 
straightforward to see that a boost of L  has the opposite effect on the institutional choice. 
 
Result 4:  If CBs receive a higher utility from holding office, this will lower the probability 
for the implementation of an independent central bank.   
 
                                                 
30 Again, this is also true for the case of .critδ δ>  as a better screening ability makes (11) more likely fulfilled 
because ( )2 . 0R L critπ π δ∂ − ∂ < . 
31 Recall that .critδ δ>  implies ( )2 . 0R L critπ π− > .  
32 For p>0.5, only rightist CBs may act opportunistically.  
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An increase of L  raises the incentives for rightist CBs to act opportunistically and thereby 
favors the choice of institution D ( )( )2 . 0R L crit Lπ π∂ − ∂ > .  
 
A similar effect arises if CBs put a larger weight on the future since ( )2 .R L critπ π−  is 
increasing in CBβ . As the chance of holding office in 2t  gets more relevant, the incentives for 
opportunistic behavior of rightist CBs will be amplified ( )0R CBq β∂ ∂ > , implying the 
following statement.   
 
Result 5:  If CBs place more weight on the future, this will make the choice of a low level of 
CBI more likely. In contrast, the probability for the implementation of an 
independent central bank will increase if the future becomes more relevant for 
politicians.    
                 
The likelihood for the implementation of an independent central bank will increase if 
politicians place a heavier weight on the future since (11) is more likely fulfilled with a higher 
Pβ  ( )( )2 . 0R L Pcritπ π β∂ − ∂ < . As the future becomes more relevant for politicians, the benefit 
of I in terms of policy durability gains importance. Conversely, myopic politicians will tend to 
choose D, as – for them – the current influence on monetary policy matters more than policy 
durability. De Haan and Van’t Hag (1995) and Dreher et al. (2006) present empirical evidence 
for this relationship but have a different explanation. The authors argue that CBI mainly 
creates long-term benefits, in terms of lower average inflation rates, whereas the potential 
benefits from surprise inflation are of short-term character. Hence, a myopic government will 
tend to choose a lower level of CBI.  
 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
 
In this article, I argue that it is difficult to explain the differences in the degree of CBI across 
countries when adopting a normative point of view. Consequently, the present paper takes a 
political economy perspective and demonstrates how the degree of CBI in a country may be 
the result of strategic policy-making. For incumbent politicians, there are costs and benefits 
associated with a high level of CBI. While an independent central bank effectively constraints 
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future governments by raising the costs of future policy changes, it also limits the 
incumbent’s chances to influence current monetary policy. Hence, incumbent politicians face 
a trade-off when choosing the degree of CBI: policy durability versus current influence on 
monetary policy. This trade-off, and thus the institutional choice, is influenced by various 
factors. The model predicts that the likelihood for incumbent politicians to implement an 
independent central bank will be higher, the worse their re-election prospects are, the more 
weight they place on future policy outcomes, and the better their ability to appoint an 
ideologically desired candidate is. Additionally, the probability for the implementation of an 
independent central bank increases in the degree of political polarization but shrinks in the 
utility central bankers receive from holding office and in the weight CBs place on future 
developments. In principle, the signaling model presented here could be applied to a wide 
range of fields. For instance, it could be used to analyze principal-agent-relationships within 
organizations, such as firms or the bureaucracy where preferences of both players (sender and 
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Appendix (Proof of proposition 1) 
  
Given politicians’ strategy (Replace CB if 1 iπ π≠ , Keep CB if 1 iπ π= ), CBs’ best responses 
are described by equations (6) and (7). 
  
Politicians’ posterior beliefs are calculated according to Bayes’ rule:  
( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )11 1
1
1 1
CB L L L





π π π π δμ π π π π π π δ δ
= ∩ = −= = = = == − + −
 ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )( )11 1
1 1
1 1
CB R R R





π π π π δμ π π π π π π δ δ
= ∩ = − −= = = = == + − −   
To proof proposition 1, one has to show that neither politician has an incentive to deviate 
from his strategy, given these posterior beliefs and CBs strategies.  
 
Party L 
In the case of 1 Lπ π= , L will not deviate from its strategy, i.e. keep the CB if 
( )









−= ≥− + − . This inequality is always fulfilled, as 1Lμ =  for 0.5p =  
( ), 0L Rq q =  and for 0.5p < ( )0, 0 .R Lq q= ≥ For 0.5p > ( )0,  0L Rq q= > the inequality 
becomes ( )1L Rq
δμ δδ δ= ≥+ −  which always holds as 1 Rq≥ . 
 
In the case of 1 Rπ π= , L will replace the CB and hence not deviate if 
( ) ( )( )1 1 1LR L R
q
q q
δμ δδ δ− = ≤+ − − . This inequality is always fulfilled as ( )1 0Rμ− =  for 
0.5p =  ( ), 0L Rq q =  and 0.5p >  ( )0, 0 ,L Rq q= > . For 0.5p < ( )0,  0R Lq q= ≥  the 
inequality becomes ( ) ( )1 1LR L
q
q
δμ δδ δ− = ≤+ −   which always holds since 1Lq ≤ . 
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−− = ≤− + − . 
This inequality always holds as ( )1 0Lμ− =  for 0.5p =  ( ), 0L Rq q =  and for 0.5p <  
( )0, 0R Lq q= ≥ . In the case of 0.5p >  ( )0, 0L Rq q= >  the inequality 
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− −= ≥+ − − . For 0.5p =  
( ), 0L Rq q =  and 0.5p >  ( )0, 0L Rq q= >  this inequality holds as 1Rμ δ= ≥ . For 0.5p <  











− ≥ . Hence, party R has no incentive to deviate from its strategy if ( )2 21 Lqδ δ− ≥ .   
 
To see that proposition 1 describes the only equilibrium of the game in pure strategies, 
consider the three other possible strategies of politician i, namely ‘always keep CB’, ‘always 
replace CB’, and (Keep CB if 1 iπ π≠ , Replace CB if 1 iπ π= ). It is straightforward that the 
strategies ‘always keep CB’ and ‘always replace CB’ are not consistent with an equilibrium in 
pure strategies. If politicians played one of these strategies, CBs would never act 
opportunistically as this would not influence their expected time in office. Therefore, CBs 
would always reveal their types which, in turn, would imply that politicians were better off 
when deviating from their strategies.  
 
If politicians played (Keep CB if 1 iπ π≠ , Replace CB if 1 iπ π= ), it would generally be 
optimal for some CBs to act opportunistically.33 In this case, there is an important difference 
to the equilibrium defined by proposition 1: since a party would replace a CB who conducted 
monetary policy in line with its preferences, there would only be opportunistic behavior of 
                                                 
33 Given this strategy, one can formally derive the critical thresholds for χ  that determine the proportions of 
leftist and rightist CBs acting opportunistically. However, these are not presented here as the specific values of 
the thresholds are not crucial to show that this strategy is not consistent with an equilibrium in pure strategies.    
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some leftist (rightist) CBs if 0.5p >  ( )0.5p < . Similar to the equilibrium described above, 
there would be no opportunistic behavior if 0.5p = . Given these reactions of CBs, this 
strategy of politicians is not consistent with an equilibrium in pure strategies, either. To see 
this, consider the case of 0.5p =  first. Here, CBs always reveal their types by setting their 
ideologically preferred inflation rate. This implies that it is optimal for party L (R) to deviate 
from its strategy by keeping a CB who set 1 Lπ π=  ( )1 Rπ π=  and replacing a CB who set 
1 Rπ π=   ( )1 Lπ π= . Similarly, for 0.5p > , politicians can deduce the CB’s type if they 
observe 1 Lπ π=  as, in this case, there is no opportunistic behavior of rightist CBs. Therefore, 
it is optimal for politicians to deviate from their strategies if 1 Lπ π= . In particular, party L (R) 
will keep (replace) a CB who set 1 Lπ π= . The same logic applies for 0.5p <  as there is no 
opportunistic behavior of leftist CBs. As a consequence, politicians will deviate from their 
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